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Abstract. Unimodal intertemporal decisions involve comparing options of the same type
(e.g., apples now versus apples later), and cross-modal decisions involve comparing
options of different types (e.g., a car now versus a vacation later). As we show, exist-
ing models of intertemporal choice do not allow time preference to depend on whether
the comparisons to be made are unimodal or cross-modal. We test this restriction in an
experiment using the delayed compensation method, a new extension of the standardmethod
of eliciting intertemporal preferences that allows for assessment of time preference for
nonmonetary and discrete outcomes, as well as for both cross-modal and unimodal com-
parisons. Participants were much more averse to delay for unimodal than cross-modal
decisions. We provide two potential explanations for this effect: one drawing on multiat-
tribute choice, the other drawing on construal-level theory.
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Introduction
In intertemporal choices, the objects of choice are dis-
tributed over time, so decision makers face variations
not only in what the outcomes are but also in when
they are received. Examples include whether to go to
a movie tonight or a football game tomorrow, whether
to take a job in sales now or to graduate and then seek
a professional career, or whether to buy a car now or
wait five years and build an extension to the house.
Conflicts between the “what” and the “when”
are central to empirical and theoretical accounts of
time preference (for surveys, see Frederick et al.
2002, Manzini and Mariotti 2009, and Urminsky and
Zauberman 2014). Such accounts usually focus on
trade-offs between quantity and timing. In much of the
empirical literature, the options are different quanti-
ties of money at different dates (e.g., $100 now versus
$120 in 12 months). When the options are not sums of
money, they are generally different quantities at differ-
ent dates of some nonmonetary object or commodity
(e.g., chocolates, the number of lives saved, grams of
cocaine).1
However, many real-world choices (including the
examples in our opening paragraph) do not reduce to
a trade-off between timing and the quantity of a given
good. Instead, not only do the goods differ in when
they occur, but also in what they are. We call such
choices cross-modal. These can be contrasted with uni-
modal choices, where the options are the same good
at different dates, even if perhaps in different quanti-
ties. We will focus on the relationship between con-
siderations of timing and considerations of what the
object to be received is by setting variations in the
quantity of goods to one side and concentrating on
choices between single items at different dates. Obvi-
ously, such choices may still be cross-modal or uni-
modal. For example, to introduce some cases from the
experiment reported below, the choice between a box of
chocolates today and a fountain pen in 60 days is cross-
modal, whereas that between a fountain pen today and
an identical pen in 60 days is unimodal. We investi-
gate whether time preference operates in the same way
(and to the same degree) in cross-modal and unimodal
choices. Our motivation for this is twofold.
First, as just noted, many everyday intertemporal
decisions are cross-modal, whereas empirical research
on time preference has usually followed a unimodal
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paradigm. Although people do face unimodal deci-
sions in their personal finances, it remains a largely
neglected question how far the lessons of unimodal
research extend to those everyday decisions that are
cross-modal.2
Second, the issueofwhether timepreferenceoperates
differently in cross-modal compared with unimodal
choices marks a divide between two approaches to
modelling: one value-based, the other attribute-based.
The former rests on a classic view that intertempo-
ral choices reduce to comparisons of values (typically,
discounted present values), with each option having a
value independent of its alternatives. On this account,
it should make no fundamental difference whether the
decisions throughwhich timepreference is revealed are
cross-modal or unimodal. We present an experimen-
tal test of this prediction, taking as our starting point
a baseline value-based model of the strength of time
preference. As we will make precise below, this model
predicts that overall aversion to delay is the same for
cross-modal and unimodal decisions.
If this prediction were confirmed, it would be good
news for those who seek to generalise findings from
research on unimodal decisions. But we find instead
that our participants are considerably more patient in
the cross-modal than in the unimodal choices that we
pose to them. Although this finding contradicts our
baseline model, it is consistent with earlier research
showing that the standard (unimodal) way of elicit-
ing time preferences appears to exaggerate observed
impatience relative to other elicitation procedures (e.g.,
Frederick 2003; Read et al. 2005, 2013). More important,
greater patience in cross-modal discounting chimes
well with an attribute-based approach. The finding is
quite intuitive if the weight that a difference in tim-
ing carries in participants’ intertemporal decision mak-
ing depends on how many other differences between
options there are to consider. We sketch an account of
our findings in this form, as well as a further account
that suggests the mental representations of options dif-
fer in unimodal and cross-modal choice.
To investigate whether revealed aversion to delay
differs systematically in strength between cross-modal
and unimodal decisions, we develop a way to measure
it that can be applied regardless of whether the options
differ in ways other than timing and quantity. This is
the delayed compensation method.
The Delayed Compensation Method
In the delayed compensation method (henceforth,
DCM), a participant first chooses between two options
that each specify a good to be received and a date
of receipt. The options may differ in the good, the
date, or both. As in the example introduced earlier, the
options might be a box of chocolates today and a pen
in 60 days, or they might be a pen today and an identi-
cal pen in 60 days. The decision maker indicates which
option she prefers and the delayed monetary compen-
sation she requires to make her just willing to accept
the dispreferred option instead of the preferred one.
Regardless of the direction of the initial preference,
monetary compensation is paid in a common period
that comes after the later of the two options’ delivery
dates (hence “delayed” compensation).
The DCM has several noteworthy features. First, by
capturing preference trade-offs using monetary com-
pensation, we avoid the need for divisibility in goods.
By paying that compensation at a common date (for
all tasks), we avoid the need for auxiliary assump-
tions about the discounting of money. By having the
common compensation date after the date of receipt
of the later good, we ensure the compensation cannot
be used to purchase either option. By using compen-
sation for having a dispreferred option instead of a
preferred one (regardless of which would be received
earlier), we guarantee that the compensation is posi-
tive and so avoid any need to take money from partic-
ipants and any suggestion that they “ought” to prefer
earlier options. We also avoid any confound with loss
aversion, such as might be introduced if we sometimes
elicited willingness to accept and sometimes willing-
ness to pay, or if we gave participants one of the options
as an initial endowment. Finally, as this paper’s imple-
mentation of it shows, the DCM allows strength of time
preference to be assessed without varying quantities of
consumption goods, thereby preventing any resulting
confounds with diminishing marginal utility.
The Fisher Diagram
Figure 1 provides a representation of the DCM and
allows us to refine the question of whether time prefer-
ence differs between cross-modal and unimodal com-
parisons. We call the figure the Fisher diagram, as it
is inspired by Chart 4 from Irving Fisher’s Theory of
Interest (1930).
Figure 1 shows two goods (A and B) and two time
periods (t  1, 2) in which a good might be received.
Together, these ingredients define four options, or
dated goods (A1 ,A2 ,B1 ,B2), shown in circles. (As
explained below, we let A be the good that is preferred
when timing is not an issue. So using our earlier exam-
ples and for someone who prefers chocolates to a pen,
A1 could be a box of chocolates today and B2 a pen in
60 days.)
In the Fisher diagram, the two horizontal arrows rep-
resent unimodal intertemporal comparisons; the two
diagonal arrows, cross-modal ones. In our unimodal
comparisons, the options differ only in the timing of
receipt; in cross-modal comparisons, the options differ
in the good to be received as well as the timing.3
In the DCM, the agent is faced with a choice at (or
before) period t  1 between two options, which are
dated goods from Figure 1. She will receive one of the
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Figure 1. Fisher Diagram
A1 A2
B1 B2
WTA: xAA
WTA: xAB
WTA: xBA
WTA: xBB
t = 1 t = 2
Notes. The Fisher diagram shows the different goods (A and B) at
specified times (t  1 and t  2) and the four different comparisons
between goods at different dates. For each pair of dated goods, the
WTA is the monetary amount that, when given in addition to the
dispreferred of the two options, will make the agent just willing
to take the dispreferred instead of the preferred option. The figure
shows a case where, in all four intertemporal comparisons, the t  1
option is preferred.
options at the time specified. She is required to state
the monetary compensation to be received at period
t  3 (i.e., some fixed time after period t  2) that is just
sufficient tomake herwilling to accept her dispreferred
option instead of her preferred one. In the language of
economics, this is her willingness to accept (WTA).
The only assumption on preferences that the DCM
requires is that the agent has preferences over the dated
goods and can specify the relevant compensations. To
streamline the exposition, we set out some additional
default assumptions imposed unless otherwise stated:
the agent prefers receiving any of the dated goods of
Figure 1 to receiving nothing and has strict preferences
between them.4 There is one good—we name it A—
that the agent prefers to the other good whenever both
would be delivered in the same period (i.e., A1 is pre-
ferred to B1, and A2 is preferred to B2).5 The agent
prefers any good delivered at t  1 to the same good
delivered at t  2 (i.e., A1 is preferred to A2, and B1
is preferred to B2). Given transitivity, it then follows
that A1 is preferred, and B2 dispreferred, to every other
option. The intuition is that A1 is the better good, with
the added advantage of early delivery, whereas B2 is
the worse good, with the added disadvantage of late
delivery. These default assumptions do not determine
preference between B1 and A2. As B1 is the worse good
but sooner, whereas A2 is the better good but later, it
is possible to prefer B1 to A2 or A2 to B1. Our analysis
will cover both cases.
We start with an agent who prefers B1 to A2 and
therefore prefers the earlier option in any given pair.
For her, the DCM always elicits the monetary compen-
sation just sufficient to induce acceptance of the later
option instead of the earlier. We use xAA to denote the
compensation required to accept A2 instead of A1, xBB
denotes the compensation required to accept B2 instead
of B1, xAB denotes the compensation required to accept
B2 instead of A1, and xBA denotes the compensation
required to accept A2 instead of B1. The first subscript
indicates the good in the earlier and preferred option;
the second subscript, the good in the later and dispre-
ferred option. So xAB and xBA relate to different com-
parisons, as Figure 1 makes clear.
The next section sets out a baseline value-based
model from which we derive precise predictions, but
we end this section by giving a parallel intuitive argu-
ment. When B1 is preferred to A2 and the default
assumptions hold, the agent prefersA1 to B1 toA2 to B2.
So, from a value-based perspective, we would expect
the cross-modal compensation term xAB to be the
largest of the four, xBA the smallest, and the unimodal
terms intermediate. Intuitively, xAB is large because it
includes compensation not only for delay but also for
taking the worse good (B) rather than the better one
(A), and xBA is small because the disadvantage of delay
is partly offset by taking the better good (A) rather than
the worse one (B). As xAB and xBA are driven in oppo-
site directions by the difference between the better and
worse goods, we compare their sum [xAB + xBA] to the
corresponding sum [xAA + xBB] of unimodal compen-
sations. If the difference between good A and good B
has equal and opposite impacts on xAB and xBA, those
impacts will cancel in the cross-modal sum, leaving
only the influences of delay. These influences will be
the same as those that drive the unimodal sum if (as
a value-based perspective implies) there is no funda-
mental difference between attitude to delay in cross-
modal and unimodal comparisons. This leads to the
prediction that, when B1 is preferred to A2, [xAB + xBA]
will equal [xAA+ xBB]. This prediction is made formally
in the next section, which also provides a correspond-
ing prediction for when A2 is preferred to B1.
A Baseline Model
We now present a model of the preferences the agent
has at the point of decision in the DCM (at or before
t  1) and how they determine the four WTA com-
pensation terms. This model is premised onmaximiza-
tion of decision utility and encompasses all commonly
cited discounting frameworks (including exponential,
hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, and constant sensitivity
forms). We specify that decision utility depends on
dated goods to be received and delayed monetary
compensation, and it is additively separable in those
two sources of utility. Although the DCM is a general
framework, as we apply it in this paper, the agent is
restricted to receive one unit of one dated good, so we
define a distinct utility for the receipt of each of these
goods, using a1, a2, b1, and b2 as the utility terms forA1,
A2, B1, and B2, respectively. These terms reflect both
the nature of the good to be received and any delay
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until that occurs.6 Finally, we define v( · ) as an increas-
ing function of monetary compensation at t  3 and set
v(0)  0.7 We refer to v( · ) as utility of money. Unless
otherwise stated, we assume that it is linear in delayed
compensation. Appendix A covers the case of dimin-
ishing marginal utility of money and gives more detail
on other aspects of the model.
We begin with an agent who prefers B1 to A2, as
in the previous section. The unimodal WTAs xAA, xBB
and the cross-modal WTAs xAB , xBA (see Figure 1) are
defined by the following equations:
a1  a2 + v(xAA), (1.i)
b1  b2 + v(xBB), (1.ii)
a1  b2 + v(xAB), (1.iii)
b1  a2 + v(xBA). (1.iv)
In each case, the left-hand side is the utility of the pre-
ferred option, the first term on the right-hand side is
the utility of the dispreferred option, and the final term
that of the compensation required to accept the dispre-
ferred option. It follows by simple arithmetic that
v(xAA) + v(xBB)  (a1 − a2) + (b1 − b2)
 (a1 − b2) + (b1 − a2)
 v(xAB) + v(xBA). (2)
With v( · ) linear, this implies that
xAA + xBB  xAB + xBA . (3)
Equation (3) is the prediction stated in the previous
section for an agent who prefers B1 to A2.
Figure 1 provides the key intuitions of our baseline
model. First, look at xAB and xAA. Each is a compen-
sation for forgoing the early A1 in exchange for a later
option: for B2 in xAB and for A2 in xAA. Since B2 is worse
than A2 , xAB exceeds xAA; it does so by an amount
determined by the difference in utility between the two
delayed goods and by the utility function for money,
v( · ). Now, look at xBB and xBA. As Figure 1 shows,
each is a compensation for forgoing B1: for B2 in xBB
and for A2 in xBA. As the agent thinks B2 is worse than
A2 , xBB exceeds xBA by an amount again determined
by the utility difference between the delayed goods
and by v( · ). So, for any given v( · ), the difference in
utility between A2 and B2 determines both [xAB − xAA]
and [xBB − xBA]. With v( · ) linear, xAB − xAA  xBB − xBA,
which rearranges to give Equation (3).
As an example using our experimental goods, imag-
ine Alice prefers the chocolates to the pen (so, for her,
good A  chocolates) and that her function v( · ) has
the simplest linear form v(x)  x, so the compensation
terms are given directly by differences in the decision
utilities of dated goods. Let those utilities be 30 and 25,
respectively, for the chocolates and pen at t  1; let
the utilities be 24 and 20, respectively, for the choco-
lates and pen at t  2. In the unimodal comparisons,
Alice demands compensations of 6 (30−24) for delay-
ing the chocolates and 5 ( 25 − 20) for delaying the
pen. In the cross-modal comparisons, she demands 10
( 30 − 20) for taking the delayed pen instead of early
chocolates and 1 ( 25− 24) for taking delayed choco-
lates instead of the early pen. The cross-modal com-
pensations have the same sum as the unimodal ones:
10+1 6+5. Equivalently, and reflecting the argument
of the previous paragraph, 10−6 5−1 4; 4 is the dif-
ference in utility between the delayed chocolates and
the delayed pen.
We now adapt the analysis for an agent who prefers
A2 to B1. The terms xAA, xBB , and xAB are defined as
before by Equations (1.i)–(1.iii). However, compensa-
tion in the DCM always accompanies the least pre-
ferred good. Therefore, xBA is undefined for this agent,
and compensation to achieve indifference between
those two options must now accompany the dispre-
ferred B1. We use yBA to denote this compensation,
which is governed by
a2  b1 + v(yBA). (1.iv’)
By simple arithmetic, using (1.i)–(1.iii) and (1.iv’),
v(xAA) + v(xBB)  (a1 − a2) + (b1 − b2)
 (a1 − b2) − (a2 − b1)
 v(xAB) − v(yBA). (2’)
With v( · ) linear, this implies that, for an agent who
prefers A2 to B1,
xAA + xBB  xAB − yBA . (3’)
The only difference between (3’) and (3) is that −yBA
appears in place of +xBA.8
To contrast −yBA with +xBA, consider the case of
Bob who, like Alice, prefers the chocolates to the pen
(so again, good A  chocolates) and has v(x)  x. But
Bob very strongly prefers the chocolates. For him, the
utilities are 50 and 25, respectively, for the chocolates
and pen at t  1 and 40 and 20, respectively, for the
chocolates and pen at t  2. In the unimodal compar-
isons, Bob demands compensations of 10 ( 50 − 40)
for delaying the chocolates and 5 ( 25− 20) for delay-
ing the pen. In the cross-modal comparisons, however,
he demands 30 ( 50 − 20) for taking the delayed pen
instead of early chocolates. But Bob likes chocolates
enough to take the delayed chocolates over the earlier
pen and demands 15 ( 40 − 25) for taking the earlier
pen instead. The compensation of 15 is yBA, and the
equality in Equation (3’) holds: 10+ 5 30− 15.
We place both +xBA and −yBA and their equivalents
for other pairs under the umbrella term cost of delay. For
any pair of dated goods with different delivery dates,
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this is the compensation required to accept the later
good when the earlier is preferred—and the negative
of the compensation required to accept the earlier good
when the later is preferred. Thus, while compensation
for taking a dispreferred option is always positive, cost
of delay can be negative. Our null hypothesis, based
on the baseline model of behaviour in the setup of Fig-
ure 1, can then be stated in the general form: the sum
of the two unimodal costs of delay equals the sum of the two
cross-modal costs of delay.9
As we have shown, this hypothesis is robust to
whether the agent prefers the “better but later” good
(A2) to the “worse but earlier” good (B1), or vice versa.
However, it does depend on the function v( · ) being
linear. Arguably, linearity of utility in money is a suit-
able assumption for the relatively small sums needed
to compensate for differences between the goods used
in the experiment. However, concavity of v( · ) is an
obvious alternative specification, which, as we show in
AppendixA, doesmatter: with v( · ) concave, themodel
predicts the sum of costs of delay will be greater for
cross-modal comparisons than for unimodal ones.
The restrictions we derive from our baseline model
are not specific to the traditional Samuelsonian dis-
counted utility model (Samuelson 1937) but apply
equally to a whole family of models from economics
and psychology. The model makes no assumptions
about whether there is a single discount function,
separate discounting for goods and money, and/or
good-specific discount functions.10 The gaps between
periods t  1, 2, and 3 can be of any calendar duration;
given their durations, any decreasing discount func-
tion is allowed.
Experiment
We have conducted a series of studies comparing uni-
modal and cross-modal intertemporal choices, using
variations of the DCM.Here, we present only the “flag-
ship” study. Its results are representative of all of the
studies.11
The study was programmed in Qualtrics and con-
ducted online in August 2014 using the Amazon
Mechanical Turk online labour market. After the
tasks described below, participants answered follow-
up questions and provided basic demographic infor-
mation, summarised in Table 1.
Design and Method
The design was an implementation of the DCM. The
goods were a good-quality fountain pen by Lamy and
a box of 36 luxury chocolates by Godiva. They were
selected because they could be sourced from Ama-
zon.com, and because their prices were similar (about
$30 each on Amazon at the time). We ordered the
items for participants either “today” or “in 60 days” as
appropriate, to be delivered (free) to the participant’s
Table 1. Demographics (n  300)
Variable Percentage or value
Female (%) 43.00
Age at last birthday (in years) (s.d.) 30.81 (9.06)
Education
Low education (%) 11.67
Medium education (%) 34.00
High education (%) 54.33
Married (%) 31.67
Has children (%) 31.33
Employed full or part time (%) 72.33
Notes. Low education is defined not having begun university.Medium
education is being currently at university. High education is having
completed university.
address. Thus, the four dated goods were a pen today,
a pen in 60 days, a box of chocolates today, and a box of
chocolates in 60 days. The experiment elicited the com-
pensation needed to induce the participant to accept
the dispreferred one out of a pair of options, each of
which was one of these dated goods. Compensation
was in the form of Amazon.com gift certificates, deliv-
ered in 90 days, which could be used by the participant
effectively as money at that time.
There were four choice conditions: two based on uni-
modal choices (chocolates today or in 60 days; a pen
today or in 60 days) and two based on cross-modal
choices (chocolates today or a pen in 60 days; a pen
today or chocolates in 60 days). Each participant was
assigned to one condition. Before starting the task,
participants were shown pictures and brief descrip-
tions of the goods. They then made a single choice
between the options. Depending on what they chose,
they were then assigned to a choice list following the
logic depicted in Figures 2(a) and 2(b). The first row in
the choice list repeated the initial choice, and in subse-
quent rows, the dispreferred optionwas supplemented
with compensating money amounts to be delivered in
90 days. The second row combined compensation of $1
in 90 days with the item they did not originally choose.
This compensation increased down the choice list in
$1 increments to $6, then in $2 increments to $20, and
$5 increments up to a maximum of $50. We chose this
maximum because it comfortably exceeded the Ama-
zon.com price of each item.
The decisions of two hypothetical individuals are
illustrated in Figure 2. For the purposes of analysis,
we measure the indifference point as the midpoint
between the highest amount that would not induce
the participant to switch and the lowest amount that
would. So in Figure 2(a), compensation for taking the
pen later over the chocolates is $13, or the midpoint
between the $12 turned down and the $14 accepted.
The individual in Figure 2(b) prefers the pen later
over the chocolates today and requires an estimated $7
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Figure 2. (Color online) Example Choice Lists
(a) Initial preference for the chocolates today
Please make your choice
The Godiva chocolates today The Lamy fountain pen in 60 days
(b) Initial preference for the pen in 60 days
Please make your choice
The Godiva chocolates today The Lamy fountain pen in 60 days
Godiva chocolates
today
Godiva chocolates
today
 Lamy fountain pen
in 60 days
 Lamy fountain pen
in 60 days
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today plus a
$1 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$2 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$3 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$4 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$5 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$6 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus an
$8 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$10 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$12 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$14 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$16 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus an
$18 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$20 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$25 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$30 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$35 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$40 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$45 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today plus a
$50 gift certificate in 90 days
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Chocolates today
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$1 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$2 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$3 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$4 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$5 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$6 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus an
$8 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$10 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$12 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$14 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$16 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus an
$18 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$20 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$25 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$30 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$35 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$40 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$45 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days plus a
$50 gift certificate in 90 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Fountain pen in 60 days
Notes. The figure shows how either initial choice (between chocolates today and a pen in 60 days) would be followed by a choice list in
which participants would indicate their WTA to take the option they did not initially choose instead of their initially preferred option. Each
participant would see the choices from either (a) or (b).
(midpoint between $6 and $8) to take the chocolates
today.12
To test for convergent validity of our unimodal
measures, we elicited two conventional measures of
time discounting after participants had completed
the DCM. One measure consisted of choices between
smaller–sooner and larger–later amounts of money,
selected from Kirby et al. (1999). The other was a
matching task adapted from Van den Bergh et al.
(2008). The participants stated the delayed sum they
regarded as just as good as $15 now, where the delays
were one week and one month, and time preference
was measured using the area-under-the-curve method
(Myerson et al. 2001). Since these tasks are unimodal,
we should expect responses to them to correlate with
those to the unimodal tasks of the DCM.
In total, 324 U.S. residents completed the survey. We
excluded 24who had opted out of receipt of goods, and
hence the incentivisation, by not providing an email
address.13 Every participant was given a five-digit ID
number. We randomly selected 37 of these numbers
to identify participants to receive one of their choices
for real, i.e., the option they had chosen in one initial
choice or one row of a choice list. This choice would
either be a good or a good plus monetary compensa-
tion in the form of an Amazon.com gift voucher. All
participants were informed that one in nine of them
would receive a choice for real and that the list of all
chosen ID numbers would be emailed to everybody,
followed by emails to the chosen participants indicat-
ing what theywould receive andwhen. The gift vouch-
ers sent out as monetary compensation were worth
$20.21 on average.
Results
Initial Choices. We first consider the initial choices be-
tween goods unaccompanied by monetary compensa-
tion. For unimodal choices, the great majority chose
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the earlier option: 84% (65/77) for chocolates and 84%
(62/74) for the pen. For cross-modal choices, the pro-
portion choosing the earlier option was much lower:
61% (48/79) chose chocolates now over a pen later, and
51% (36/70) chose a pen now over chocolates later.
Because these proportions are lower (p < 0.001) for
cross-modal than unimodal, cross-modal choices are
at least partly determined by preferences over goods.
Because they sum to more than 100% (albeit not sig-
nificantly; p  0.124), choices also seem at least partly
determined by time. Time, however, is not decisive,
since 43% (65/149) of participants facing a cross-modal
choice chose the delayed option.
Cost of Delay. Our main question is whether the im-
pact of time is the same whenmaking cross-modal and
unimodal choices. This is measured by cost of delay.
The baseline model predicts that, for each individ-
ual, the sum (or, equivalently, the average) of that indi-
vidual’s two cross-modal costs of delay equals the sum
(respectively, average) of their two unimodal costs of
delay. In our design, each participant reveals the cost
of delay for one pair of options. Random assignment
to groups then implies that, if the baseline model is
correct, we should find the average cost of delay across
the participants completing cross-modal tasks equal
to average cost of delay across the participants com-
pleting unimodal cases. But that is not at all what we
observe.
Figure 3 shows the cost of delay for each pair
of options, averaged across participants making the
choice between those options. Each cross-modal col-
umn in the figure is markedly shorter than each uni-
modal column, indicating that average observed cost
of delay is lower for cross-modal than unimodal com-
parisons. More precisely, the mean values for cost of
delay in each of the comparisons are as follows:
Unimodal—chocolates: cost of delay $5.31,
Unimodal—pens: cost of delay $3.91,
Chocolates now, pens later: cost of delay $0.12,
Pens now, chocolates later: cost of delay $0.86.
Aggregating across chocolates and pens, the mean
cost of delay is much lower for cross-modal compar-
isons ($0.46) than for unimodal ones ($4.63), and the
difference is statistically significant (p  0.006).
The difference between unimodal and cross-modal
cost of delay was confirmed with two analyses. The
first was an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
that pooled responses from all questions but, as indi-
cated in Endnote 12, excluded participants who did not
switch. As a further check on robustness, we conducted
a Tobit regression (Amemiya 1973), which allowed us
to include these individuals. We did this by assigning
them a WTA of $52.50, as if they would have switched
Figure 3. The Average Cost of Delay for Each
Intertemporal Comparison Across Participants Who
Made That Comparison
Co
st
 o
f d
el
ay
 ($
)
Cross-modal Unimodal
8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
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0
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Notes. For each comparison, a participant’s cost of delay is obtained
from his or herWTA for taking the dispreferred option instead of the
preferred one. Cost of delay is given by WTA itself when the sooner
option is preferred and by minus WTA (hence, negative) when the
later option is preferred. Dark bars are for cross-modal comparisons
and light bars for unimodal ones. The upper 95% confidence interval
is shown. “C” stands for the box of chocolates and “P” for the pen.
For each column, the first letter denotes the good in the earlier option
and the second letter the good in the later option.
had there been one more increment in the choice list.
The Tobit takes into account the truncation of data at
±$52.50. The results for both analyses are presented
in Table 2, with and without demographic controls. In
all four regressions, the coefficient on the cross-modal
dummy is significant and negative, confirming the ear-
lier analysis.
Correlationswith Conventional Measures of Time Pref-
erence. To test whether the unimodal comparisons of
our DCM capture the same kind of time preference as
conventional measures, we correlated unimodal costs
of delay to the standard time preference measures,
separately for the pen and the chocolates. This anal-
ysis, reported in Table 3, suggests that the conven-
tional time preference measures typically correlate in
the expected direction with the unimodal cost of delay,
especially for the two choice-based conventional mea-
sures (where p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively). The
correlation between the conventional measures and the
cross-modal costs of delay are not significant at the 95%
confidence level.
Non-Preference-Based Influences. So far we have test-
ed whether responses to the DCM reflect preferences
that are aligned with the baseline model, and our
results suggest they do not. In the Discussion, we will
consider preference-based alternatives to the baseline
model, but here, we investigate the possibility that
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Table 2. Influence of Cross-Modality on Cost of Delay
Cost of delay ($) OLS excl. no-switch Tobit incl. no-switch OLS excl. no-switch Tobit incl. no-switch
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Cross-modal (dummy, 1 yes) −4.17∗∗∗ −5.52∗∗∗ −4.09∗∗∗ −5.43∗∗∗
(1.49) (1.67) (1.57) (1.75)
Female (dummy, 1 yes) −2.25 0.19
(1.53) (1.77)
Age at last birthday (years) −0.04 −0.12
(0.11) (0.12)
Low education (dummy, 1 yes) −0.41 −0.19
(2.64) (2.65)
High education (dummy, 1 yes) −2.35 −0.60
(1.76) (2.30)
Married (dummy, 1 yes) 0.08 −0.60
(2.19) (2.30)
Has children (dummy, 1 yes) 0.76 2.46
(2.34) (2.52)
Employed full or part time −1.30 −2.38
(dummy, 1 yes) (1.83) (2.18)
Constant 4.63∗∗∗ 6.36∗∗∗ 8.88∗∗∗ 11.30∗∗∗
(0.73) (1.05) (3.05) (3.24)
n 292 298 292 298
R2 0.026 0.044
Pseudo-R2 0.004 0.006
Sigma (Tobit) 14.58 14.48
(1.00) (0.99)
Notes. The terms “incl. no-switch” and “excl. no-switch” denote regressions including and excluding data from respondents who never
switched, respectively. Where these data are included, Tobit regression allows for the truncation of the data. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
responses to theDCMmay reflect influences other than
preferences.
For “choice lists” similar to those used in this study,
people sometimes switch near the middle of the scale
or, less frequently, at other focal points (Andersen et al.
2006). To see how such scale effects might contribute
to our results, consider an extreme case in which every
participant demands the same compensation (say, $10),
regardless of her preference and of which choice she
faced. Suppose that, in a given choice, the propor-
tion f of participants prefer the earlier option over the
Table 3. Correlations Between Cost of Delay and the
Conventional Time Preference Measures
DCM comparison Conventional Significance
(sooner good–later good) task Correlation (p-value)
Choc–choc Choice 0.3025 0.0083
Matching −0.1953 0.0931
Pen–pen Choice 0.2574 0.0314
Matching −0.0409 0.7368
Choc–pen Choice 0.1563 0.1717
Matching 0.0363 0.7526
Pen–choc Choice 0.1067 0.3828
Matching −0.2037 0.0932
later one. For these participants, the cost of delay is
calculated as their raw WTA. But for the proportion
1 − f of participants who prefer the later option, the
cost of delay is the negative of their raw WTA. Thus,
if all raw WTAs are driven by a scale effect to $10,
the average cost of delay in a given choice is driven to
the dollar sum 10 f − 10(1 − f )  10(2 f − 1). When we
compare two choice tasks, this scale effect will drive
the average cost of delay for the task with the lower
f below that for the task with the higher f . As cross-
modal tasks may pit preferences over type of good
against those over timing, we would expect f to be
systematically lower in cross-modal tasks than in uni-
modal tasks. Indeed, that is what we find. So a strong
enough scale effect would tend to draw average cost
of delay for a cross-modal comparison below that for
a unimodal comparison. Evidently, this argument does
not require the specific value of $10 as the one to which
scale effects draw raw WTA responses. But besides f
taking different values for cross-modal and unimodal
cases, the argument does crucially depend on scale
effects drawing raw WTA responses toward specific
values, regardless of the options.
We address this possibility in two ways: first, by
looking directly for evidence that raw WTAs are inde-
pendent of the choice faced, and second, by excluding
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from our analysis the most obvious candidate for a
salient fixed value to which scale effects might draw
responses.
First, we provide evidence of significant differences
between raw WTA responses across the four choices.
The means for the cross-modal cases are $14.28 (choco-
lates now, pen later) and $9.22 (pen now, choco-
lates later). These are significantly different from one
another (p  0.0043). The unimodal means are closer
in value, at $8.00 (chocolates now and later) and $6.10
(pen now and later), and they do not differ signifi-
cantly at the 95% confidence level (p  0.0723). Cru-
cially, equality between the mean unimodal raw WTA
and mean cross-modal raw WTA can be rejected at the
99% confidence level. These points suggest that the dis-
tributions of raw responses are different between tasks,
reflecting sensitivity to the options and to strength of
preference between them.
Second, we drop the most likely candidate for a
scale effect-driven response. Since 23% of the sample
switches at the $10 row, we repeated the OLS and
Tobit regressions of cost of delay on cross-modality
and demographics but remove from the sample partici-
pants that switch in this row. Table 4 reports the results
of these regressions, showing that despite the smaller
sample size, the cross-modal effect persists. The effect
Table 4. Influence of Cross-Modality on Cost of Delay, Excluding Those Who Switched for $10
Cost of delay ($) OLS excl. no-switch Tobit incl. no-switch OLS excl. no-switch Tobit incl. no-switch
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Cross-modal (dummy, 1 yes) −3.90∗ −5.69∗∗∗ −3.89∗ −5.42∗∗
(1.86) (2.14) (2.03) (2.27)
Female (dummy, 1 yes) 2.33 1.02
(1.91) (2.26)
Age at last birthday (years) −0.03 −0.15
(0.14) (0.16)
Low education (dummy, 1 yes) −0.46 0.02
(3.33) (3.32)
High education (dummy, 1 yes) −3.07 −0.09
(2.25) (2.62)
Married (dummy, 1 yes) −0.28 −1.19
(2.94) (3.08)
Has children (dummy, 1 yes) 0.27 3.43
(3.22) (3.50)
Employed full or part time −0.29 −1.78
(dummy, 1 yes) (2.28) (2.74)
Constant 3.94∗∗∗ 6.24∗∗∗ 7.78∗∗ 10.74∗∗∗
(0.89) (1.50) (3.89) (4.10)
n 223 229 223 229
R2 0.019 0.037
Pseudo-R2 0.004 0.005
Sigma (Tobit) 16.18 — 16.08
(0.77) (1.17)
Notes. The terms “incl. no-switch” and “excl. no-switch” denote regressions including and excluding data from respondents who never
switched, respectively. Where these data are included, Tobit regression allows for the truncation of the data. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
size is similar to that in Table 2, and the effect is sig-
nificant at the 90% confidence level (at least) in all
cases.
Discussion
So far we have made three contributions: we pre-
sented a new preference measurement instrument,
crystallised the implications of standard (value-based)
theories for the relationship between unimodal and
cross-modal intertemporal comparisons, and provided
empirical findings at oddswith the predictions of those
theories. We now discuss how the DCM relates to stan-
dardmethods, explain how our baseline model is char-
acteristic of value-based modelling approaches, and
then take the first steps toward a view of preference
that can explain our empirical finding.
Measurement Instrument. We have already stated the
main distinctive advantages of the DCM. But although
the DCM departs from more traditional methods,
such as eliciting an indifference point between smaller
sooner and larger later sums of money, both the DCM
and the traditional methods share the same core idea,
which is that agents require compensation to accept the
delay of an outcome, and this compensation provides
a measure of time preference.
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It is evident the DCM works on this principle, but it
might be less clear how the more traditional methods
do. Here, we demonstrate the commonality by show-
ing how each task of the DCM can be reduced to the
canonical task in two steps. In the first step, abolish the
distinction between t  3 and t  2, so that compensa-
tion is received at the same time as the later good. In
the second step, make both the earlier and later good
be the same fixed amount of money rather than dis-
crete consumer goods. The good and the compensation
are then in the same divisible units; the task elicits the
adjustment to an initial sum of money that the partic-
ipant requires to delay its receipt from t  1 to t  2.
For example, a participant who is indifferent between
$100 today and $120 in six months is revealing she will
demand $20 compensation in sixmonths to accept $100
in six months instead of $100 today.
The DCM is more general than the canonical task
in that it achieves divisibility of compensation without
requiring divisibility of goods. This permits the goods
to be discrete and different from one another, so allow-
ing for cross-modal comparisons and many other pos-
sibilities, while leaving unaffected the core underlying
idea about compensation as a measure of preference.
The Value-Based Modelling Approach. Earlier we
used a baseline model to derive the hypothesis that the
sum of cross-modal costs of delay equals the sum of
unimodal costs of delay in the setup summarized by
the Fisher diagram (see Figure 1). A key assumption for
this hypothesis was linearity of utility for the relevant
money amounts. Linear utility is a standard assump-
tion for small money amounts, but concavity is an obvi-
ous alternative and has been proposed even for small
amounts (e.g., Andersen et al. 2008, Andreoni and
Sprenger 2012, Galanter 1962, Kahneman and Tversky
1979). In Appendix A, we show that assuming concav-
ity does change the prediction of the baseline model.
But this does not redeem the baseline model, because
the change is in the opposite direction of what we
observe.
As argued above, the baseline model is quite gen-
eral when considered within the class of value-based
accounts of intertemporal comparison. Nevertheless,
it relies on the fundamental principle of the value-
based approach, that the utility of a given dated good
is independent of its comparators. To see this, recall the
argument that follows Equation (3) showing why, for
an agent who prefers B1 to A2 and has v( · ) linear,
[xAB − xAA] equals [xBB − xBA]. The argument is that
each square-bracketed term is given by the difference
in utility between the delayed goods B2 and A2. It rests
on an implicit assumption that it does notmatter to that
difference whether these delayed goods are received
instead of A1 (as they are for xAB and xAA) or instead
of B1 (as they are for xBB and xBA). As this assumption
is just an application of the fundamental principle, it
will typically carry over into other value-based mod-
els. In view of this, we now explore explanations of our
findings that depart from the value-based approach.
Explaining the Cross-Modal Effect. We provide two
potential explanations for the discrepancy between
cross-modal and unimodal choice that assume, respec-
tively, that the weights put on option features and the
interpretation of those options vary with what they are
compared with. In the first explanation, which draws
on insights from multiattribute choice (Houston and
Sherman 1995), the weight put on each attribute of an
option is inversely related to howmany attributes differ
between those options. The second explanation draws
on construal-level theory (Trope and Liberman 2003)
and proposes that the mental representation of options
depends on what they are compared to.
The first explanation treats the delay in intertempo-
ral choices as only one attribute among many.14 All
attributes, including delay, receive a decision weight
that is directly related to their general importance and
inversely related to the number of attributes that differ
between options.15 To illustrate the idea in an atempo-
ral context, consider the value a consumer might place
on the “color” attribute when valuing two used cars.
Suppose this consumer will pay $100 more for a blue
car than a red one when the cars differ only in color.
Now suppose the cars differ inmultiple attributes, such
as model, engine size, mileage, age, and the upholstery
on the seats. As these differences proliferate, the impact
of color will likely decline until it plays little if any role
in that consumer’s valuation of the cars. In general,
as options become less similar in other respects, the
weight on any differentiating attribute will decrease.16
We now briefly outline a model based on this intu-
ition, which is elaborated and generalised in Ap-
pendix B. Consider a stylised attribute specification of
our four experimental options. Because the goods are
either identical (in the unimodal comparisons) or very
different (in the cross-modal), we capture the nature
of the options as two elements in a vector, correspond-
ing to the presence or absence of a particular good.
The vector has an additional element for the timing of
the good. If chocolates are the preferred good, a box
of chocolates available now can be denoted as A1 
(α, 0, pi), where the first element is nonzero because the
box of chocolates is present, and α denotes the atem-
poral value of the chocolates. The second element is
zero because the pen is absent (if present, we denote
it as β), and the third is pi because the good is avail-
able now. Options are compared by first taking the
difference between two option vectors and then the
(possibly weighted) sum of the elements of the result-
ing difference vector. This corresponds to the cogni-
tive process of comparing options and computing their
differences on each attribute. As an illustration, take
two options—the chocolates now, A1  (α, 0, pi), and
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Table 5. Multiattribute Accounts of Cross-Modal and Unimodal Choices
Equal weight model Unequal weight model
Aggregate Aggregate
Mode Options Attributes Difference difference Sum weighted difference Sum
Unimodal A1 (α, 0, pi) [0, 0, pi] pi piA2 (α, 0, 0)
B1 (0, β, pi) [0, 0, pi] pi pi
B2 (0, β, 0)
2pi 2pi
Cross-modal A1 (α, 0, pi) [α,−β, pi] pi+ (α− β) (pi+ (α− β))/3
B2 (0, β, 0)
B1 (0, β, pi) [−α, β, pi] pi− (α− β) (pi− (α− β))/3
A2 (α, 0, 0)
2pi
( 2
3
)
pi
the pen later, B2  (0, β, 0)—and compute the difference
between them on each attribute, A1 − B2  [α,−β, pi].
Provided each attribute is weighted equally, and using an
additive specification, the strength of preference will
follow the sum of these differences: the unweighted
sum of the three elements is α − β + pi. The relative
sizes of α, β, and pi are then enough to determine both
the choice between A1 and B2 and the compensation
required to take the less preferred of the two. (As A
denotes the preferred good, α > β, and preference is
for A1, given any pi > 0. The compensation depends
on all three terms.) This specification has an affinity
with the baseline model in that combined strength of
preference for both unimodal and cross-modal choices
are the same as shown by the “Equal weight model”
columns of Table 5.
Suppose, however, our decision maker has limited
attention and, as attribute differences proliferate, finds
she has to spread that attentionmore thinly. Themodel
detailed in Appendix B is based on the idea that a
fixed quantity of attention is allocated over attributes
that differ. Although the model is more general, a sim-
ple instance is shown in the “Unequal weight model”
column of Table 5. In this instance, for the unimodal
case, delay is the only attribute that differs, and so
it receives a weight of one; in the cross-modal case,
all three attributes vary, not only delay, and so each
receives a weight of one-third. This leads the combined
strength of preference (the final column of Table 5) to
be lower for cross-modal choices.
An additional and related explanation is that
whether a choice is cross-modal or unimodal influ-
ences the mental representation or construal of choice
options. This extends the idea that the objects of choice
are not defined by their physical properties but in
their interpretation by the agent (e.g., Nisbett and Ross
1991), a notion that has received a substantial boost in
the formof construal-level theory (Liberman and Trope
1998). To illustrate the idea, again imagine choosing
between two cars, where car A is available now and
car B later. When comparing the cars, we are likely to
define them in terms of features such as “color” and
“leather seats.” Now imagine choosing between car A
now and a vacation next year.Wewill certainly think of
the two options differently—perhaps defining them in
terms of their different purposes such as “transporta-
tion” and “relaxation.” It would not be surprising if
these different construals led to differences in the value
placed on car A. Likewise, when choosing between
chocolates now and later, our construal may be based
on considerations such as the tastiness of the chocolates
or how they melt in the mouth. This concrete represen-
tation can promote a preference for earlier receipt of the
good (Chen and He 2011). By contrast, when making
cross-modal choices we may care less about when the
good is received, because we construe the options in
terms of their more abstract and functional character-
istics (perhaps improving a relationship, or writing a
novel); see, e.g., Kim et al. (2013), Liberman and Trope
(1998), and Liberman et al. (2002).
A study by Malkoc et al. (2010, Experiments 1A
and 1B) also suggests that similarity between options,
which is central to our distinction between cross-modal
and unimodal choices, can influence patience, and
does so by changing the way options are construed.
Malkoc et al. did not elicit cross-modal and unimodal
intertemporal choices, but rather elicited intertempo-
ral choices after first having their participants make
what we would call a “relatively unimodal” compari-
son (a feature-by-feature comparison of two very sim-
ilar digital cameras) and a “relatively cross-modal”
comparison (between one of the digital cameras and a
film camera with which it shared none of the specified
features). After making the comparison, participants
indicated how eager they were to receive a digital cam-
era by indicating their WTA to agree to a 3- and 10-day
delay in the delivery of that camera.Malkoc et al. found
that participants weremore sensitive to the delaywhen
the initial comparison was (in our terminology) uni-
modal rather than cross-modal and also that that par-
ticipants were generally more patient (although not
significantly so) when a cross-modal evaluation had
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preceded their choice. Malkoc et al. also observed that
their participants construed the choice options more
abstractly in their cross-modal-like comparison case,
and that this difference in construal mediated the dif-
ferences in patience in the two conditions.
The notion of “relative” cross-modality, hinted at
in the above paragraph, brings in a broader issue. In
our design the unimodal choices were between identi-
cal objects and the cross-modal choices between radi-
cally different objects. But there are many intermediate
possibilities, such as choosing between a rescued cat
from the animal shelter today or a pedigree cat from
a litter yet to be born. Our experiment tested extreme
cases, with delay the only attribute that varied between
options in unimodal comparisons. As we have shown,
such comparisons are likely to accentuate the impor-
tance of time. A similar mechanism could be at work
in canonical measures of time preference used in the
previous literature. Thesemeasures vary two attributes
(quantity and timing), which is fewer than the num-
ber that would vary in many cross-modal decisions of
everyday life. While there is much to learn about the
role of time in complex decisions, our findings sug-
gest that time does not have an absolute or predefined
importance in decision making.
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Appendix A. Further Analysis of the
Baseline Model
In this appendix, we flesh out some details of the baseline
model and extend it to cover the case where utility of money
is nonlinear. We assume the agent’s decisions, taken at or
before the start of t  1, maximise the following objective
function, each component of which is a subutility function
that is finitely valued and strictly increasing in all arguments:
U  u(A1 ,A2 ,B1 ,B2)+ v( · ). (A.1)
This functional form imposes additive separability between
dated goods and money, with utility from the former
denoted by u( · ) and from the latter by v( · ). We impose
that each dated good takes either the value 1 (indicating
the agent receives it) or the value 0. Without further loss
of generality, define the notation used in the main text as
follows: u(1, 0, 0, 0) ≡ a1; u(0, 1, 0, 0) ≡ a2; u(0, 0, 1, 0) ≡ b1;
u(0, 0, 0, 1) ≡ b2. We normalise u(0, 0, 0, 0) to zero.
Following the default assumptions of the main text, we
ignore indifference between dated goods and impose that
A1  B1, A2  B2, A1  A2, and B1  B2, with  denoting
strict preference. This leaves open the preference over B1 and
A2 where considerations of preference over timing and pref-
erence over types of good can conflict. For brevity, in this
appendix, we use the term “order TP” (for timing-based pref-
erence) for the case where B1  A2 and “order GP” (for good-
based preference) for the case where A2  B1.
The terms xAA, xBB , and xAB are given by Equations (1.i)–
(1.iii) in the main text. For order TP, xBA is given by Equa-
tion (1.iv); for order GP, yBA is given by Equation (1.iv’). The
calculations in the main text demonstrate that, regardless of
the functional form of v( · ), Equation (2) holds under order
TP and Equation (2’) under order GP. When v( · ) is linear,
Equations (2) and (2’) imply Equations (3) and (3’), respec-
tively, which establish the null hypothesis of the baseline
model. However, linearity of v( · ) is crucial for the transition
from Equation (2) (respectively, (2’)) to Equation (3) (respec-
tively, (3’)). The main task of this appendix is to show how
the argument would be affected if v( · ) is strictly concave.
Take order TP first. It follows from its definition and the
default assumptions that ∞ > a1 > b1 > a2 > b2 > 0. These
inequalities along with Equations (1.i)–(1.iv) imply that ∞ >
v(xAB)  a1 − b2 > a1 − a2  v(xAA) > 0 and ∞ > v(xBB)  b1 −
b2 > b1− a2  v(xBA)> 0, whereas Equation (2) yields v(xAB)−
v(xAA) v(xBB)−v(xBA). Since v( · ) is strictly increasing, these
points imply that v(xAB) − v(xAA) and v(xBB) − v(xBA) are
equal increments to v( · ) induced by increases in its argu-
ment, in one case from xAA to xAB and in the other case
from xBA to xBB . From Equations (1.iii) and (1.ii), v(xAB) 
a1− b2 > b1− b2  v(xBB). Consequently, with v( · ) strictly con-
cave, xAB − xAA > xBB − xBA. Rearranging yields xAB + xBA >
xAA + xBB . This inequality replaces Equation (3) when v( · ) is
concave and preference order TP applies.
Now consider order GP, with which (together with the
default assumptions) implies ∞ > a1 > a2 > b1 > b2 > 0 (NB:
a2 and b1 are flipped relative to order TP). As a first step,
define the sum of money z such that v(z) a1 − b1 and recall
that v(0)  0. From these points and Equations (1.ii)–(1.iii),
v(xAB) − v(z) b1 − b2  v(xBB) − v(0). Since v( · ) is increasing
and b1 − b2 > 0, each of the terms v(xAB) − v(z) and v(xBB) −
v(0) is an increment to v( · ) induced by an increase in its
argument, in one case from z to xAB and in the other case
from 0 to xBB ; the two increments are equal since, as just
noted, v(xAB)−v(z) v(xBB)−v(0). Equations (1.ii)–(1.iii) also
imply v(xAB)  a1 − b2 > b1 − b2  v(xBB). Combining these
conclusions, strict concavity of v( · ) implies
xAB − z > xBB − 0. (A.2)
Now, using Equations (1.i) and (1.iv’), v(z) − v(xAA)  a2 −
b1  v(yBA)−v(0). Since v( · ) is increasing and a2− b1 > 0, each
of the terms v(z)− v(xAA) and v(yBA)− v(0) is an increment to
v( · ) induced by an increase in its argument, in one case from
xAA to z and in the other case from 0 to yBA. Moreover, as
just noted, v(z)− v(xAA) v(yBA)− v(0). Since v(z) a1 − b1 >
a2 − b1  v(yBA), v(z) > v(yBA). Combining these conclusions,
strict concavity of v( · ) implies
z − xAA > yBA − 0. (A.3)
From (A.2) and (A.3), [xAB − z]+ [z − xAA] > xBB + yBA. Rear-
ranging yields xAB − yBA > xAA + xBB . This inequality replaces
Equation (3’) when v( · ) is concave and preference order GP
applies.
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These arguments and those of the main text establish the
following summarising result, which encapsulates all fea-
tures of the baseline model needed for the paper.
Proposition 1. In the baseline model,
(i) xAB + xBA ≥ xAA + xBB for preference order TP;
(ii) xAB − yBA ≥ xAA + xBB for preference order GP; and
(iii) in both (i) and (ii), the weak inequality holds as an equality
when v( · ) is linear and as a strict inequality when v( · ) is strictly
concave.
This result shows that, provided each participant displays
either preference order TP or preference order GP, concavity
of v( · ) cannot rationalise failure of the null hypothesis of
the baseline model unless that failure takes the form that
the combined cross-modal cost of delay exceeds the combined
unimodal cost of delay. The opposite could, of course, be
explained by convexity of v( · ), but that would be a very
unusual assumption since we are only concerned with v( · )
in the domain of monetary gains.17
Appendix B. A Weighted Multiattribute
Intertemporal Choice Model
Here, we provide a more general and formal account of
the weighted multiattribute intertemporal choice model
sketched in the main paper and illustrated in Table 5, and we
extend the argument to include explicit reference to mone-
tary compensation. The model draws on ideas from a range
of earlier researchers and has some formal properties in com-
mon with the model of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013). The model
is specifically developed in the context of our experimental
setup, and we do not claim greater generality for it.
The two goods and the two time periods are as in Figure 1,
yielding the same four dated goods. But now, as depicted in
Table 5, let there be three attributes on which a dated good
can be evaluated: attribute 1 takes the value α if the good to
be received is of type A and 0 otherwise, attribute 2 takes the
value β if the good is of type B and 0 otherwise, and attribute 3
takes the value pi if the goodwill be received in t  1 and 0 if it
will be received in t  2. We impose α, β, and pi > 0.18
For brevity, we address only the case where, in any com-
parison between dated goods, the agent prefers the one with
a sooner delivery date, denoted by S, over the one with the
later delivery date, denoted by L. As in the main text, we use
x to denoteWTA for taking the dispreferred option instead of
the preferred one. The WTA is determined by the difference
between the sums of weighted attributes for each option:∑
r∈<
wr[Sr − Lr] v(x), (B.1)
where v( · ) is an increasing function defined on money;< is
the set of attributes, with typical element r. The terms Sr and
Lr are, respectively, the values of S and L for attribute r; and
wr is the weight put on attribute r when comparing S and L.
Note that money is treated separately from other attributes to
make its role as a measure of the “cost” of exchanges of dated
goods clear. This makes the analysis simpler and comparable
in this respect to the baseline model, without altering the key
mechanism that we model. It does differ formally, however,
from previous attribute-based choice models of time prefer-
ence where money is treated similar to other attributes (e.g.,
Scholten and Read 2010).
The weight put on each attribute is a function of the abso-
lute difference between the two options on that attribute and
the sum of those absolute differences for all attributes where
the two options differ. That is, for any attribute r ∈<,
wr  g(|Sr − Lr |)
/ ∑
r′∈<′
g(Dr′), (B.2)
where<′ is the subset of< containing those attributeswhere
S and L take different values, Dr′ is the maximum (in abso-
lute value) difference in values possible on attribute r′ ∈ <′,
and g( · ) is an increasing function with g(0)  0. The for-
mulation (B.2) imposes no restrictions on the relative sizes
of g(α), g(β), and g(pi), leaving the decision maker free to
regard any attribute as “intrinsically” more important than
any other. However, an attribute for which S and L take
the same value has no bearing on the choice between them.
Instead, a total decisionweight of unity is spread across those
attributes where S and L differ in proportions determined by
their intrinsic importance. (This generalises the case consid-
ered in Table 5.)
In the value-vector form, A1  (α, 0, pi), A2  (α, 0, 0), B1 
(0, β, pi), and B2  (0, β, 0). As in the main text, we let good
A be the preferred good. To ensure this and that, in every
intertemporal comparison, the earlier option is preferred to
the later one, it suffices to impose pig(pi) > αg(α) − βg(β) > 0.
Then, xAA and xBB are defined implicitly by
[pig(pi)/g(pi)] v(xAA), (B.3)
[pig(pi)/g(pi)] v(xBB), (B.4)
i.e., by pi  v(xAA)  v(xBB). It is an immediate implication
that xAA  xBB . Note, however, that this implication would be
relaxed hadwe allowed different delay attributes for different
goods.
For brevity, we denote the sum g(α) + g(β) + g(pi) as Ω.
Then xAB satisfies
[pig(pi)+ (αg(α) − βg(β))]/Ω v(xAB). (B.5)
Similarly, xBA satisfies
[pig(pi) − (αg(α) − βg(β))]/Ω v(xBA). (B.6)
We now work out the implications of these implicit defini-
tions for the relationship between cross-modal and unimodal
WTAs. First, suppose v(x) x. Then,
xAA + xBB  2pi (B.7)
and
xAB + xBA  [2pig(pi)/Ω]. (B.8)
Thus, xAA + xBB > xAB + xBA, because the ratio g(pi)/Ω, which
we will call the cross-modal deflator, is less than unity. By a
trivial extension of the argument, xAA + xBB > xAB + xBA is
guaranteed for any linear v( · ).
Now, suppose v( · ) is concave. From Equations (B.3) and
(B.4), v(xAA) and v(xBB) each takes thevaluepi. Relative to this,
the value of v(xBA) in (B.6) is deflated in two ways. First, pi is
deflated by the cross-modal deflator g(pi)/Ω; then the result is
further reduced by subtracting (αg(α) − βg(β))/Ω(> 0) from
it. Since v( · ) is increasing, it follows that each of xAA and xBB
exceeds xBA. By contrast, relative to v(xAA) and v(xBB), the
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value of v(xAB) is reduced by the corresponding operation of
the cross-modal deflator but then increased by the addition of
(αg(α) − βg(β))/Ω to the result. Consequently, the average of
v(xAB) and v(xBA) is constant at [pig(pi)/Ω], which is unam-
biguously below the average of v(xAA) and v(xBB). However,
ceteris paribus, a rise in (αg(α) − βg(β))/Ω will increase the
deviationsof v(xAB)and v(xBA) frompig(pi)/Ωandso increase
(xAB + xBA)/2, if v( · ) is concave. Taken far enough, this effect
may be able to raise (xAB + xBA) over (xAA + xBB). However, for
that to happen, the effect would have to outweigh the down-
ward impact of the cross-modal deflator on (xAB + xBA).
Intuitively, (xAA+ xBB) reflects twice the cost of delay when
that cost is at its maximum in the sense that all attention
is paid to delay. By contrast, (xAB + xBA) reflects twice the
cost of delay when the decision maker is partly distracted
from delay by other matters. Those other matters tend to
drive xAB up because it must compensate for a worse type of
good rather than a better one, whereas they tend to drive xBA
down for the converse reason. Although exchange-of-type-
of-good considerations have an impact on the cross-modal
WTA terms, those impacts cancel out when the cross-modal
WTAs are summed, if v( · ) is linear. They need not cancel
out if v( · ) is nonlinear, but nevertheless, they go in oppo-
site directions in the two cross-modal cases. In many cases,
the combined impact of exchange-of-good-considerations on
(xAB + xBA) is likely to be of second-order importance, espe-
cially if v( · ) is only mildly nonlinear. By contrast, the down-
ward effect of the cross-modal deflator on the relative impact
of delay considerations on (xAB + xBA) compared with (xAA +
xBB) is a first-order matter.
Endnotes
1Examples include Chapman (1996), Frederick (2006), Hardisty and
Weber (2009), Kim et al. (2013), McClure et al. (2007), Reuben et al.
(2010), and Ubfal (2016).
2Bickel et al. (2011) study what they call cross-commodity discount-
ing for choices betweenmoney and cocaine. Theirmethods and goals
are significantly different from ours.
3For the reasons given in the introduction, in this paper’s applica-
tion of the DCM, we specify that A1 and A2 are identical objects
received at different dates (and likewise, B1 and B2). However, in a
more general form, the DCMwould allow them to differ by quantity
and quality as well as by timing: for example, A1 could be a box of
10 chocolates and A2 a box of 15; B1 could be a ballpoint pen and B2
a fountain pen, in each case delivered at the relevant date.
4Allowing indifference between dated goods would just proliferate
uninteresting cases.
5 In our experiment, the two goods are a box of chocolates and a
fountain pen.We allow either of them to take the role of the preferred
good A for a given participant. Thus, all that is ruled out here is the
possibility that the participant prefers one of the goods, if delivered
at t  1, and the other, if delivered at t  2. Although not logically
impossible, we do not see this as an important case. (A separate study
that tested directly for this possibility using the same goods found
its incidence to be negligible.)
6 It is significant that we model impacts on decision utility (viewed
from the moment of decision) of the prospect of receiving a good
of a given type at a given date, making no assumption about when
the good is consumed except that it does not precede receipt. Thus,
we avoid problems that arise for some intertemporal decision exper-
iments if capital markets and/or storage allow consumption to
be rescheduled across time relative to income when the analysis
assumes consumption and income to be simultaneous (for discus-
sion, see, e.g., Cubitt and Read 2007, Frederick et al. 2002).
7This is a simple way to capture that if (contrary to our default
assumptions) the agent were indifferent between two options, no
compensation would be required to persuade her to take one rather
than the other. As monetary compensation to take a dispreferred
option is always positive, we define v( · ) only on the nonnegative
interval. So we require no assumptions about utility of money in the
domain of monetary losses. As monetary compensation is at t  3,
the function v( · ) embeds any discounting of money in that period
as viewed from the moment of decision. The framework is neutral
about when the money is spent (or on what, provided only that this
does not interact with utility from goods received in the earlier peri-
ods in a way that would affect the relationship between cross-modal
and unimodal comparisons).
8Some readers may be tempted to think that xBA −yBA (e.g., if they
combine Equations (3) and (3’)). This is not correct. For any agent
with a strict preference between B1 and A2, only one of xBA and yBA
is defined, and only one of Equations (3) and (3’) holds.
9This formulation is for the case employed here in which there are
two types of good. With k > 2 types of goods, the corresponding,
more general hypothesis is that the average of the cross-modal costs
of delay equals the average of the unimodal costs of delay, an amend-
ment needed because, in general, there are k−1 times as many cross-
modal as unimodal comparisons.
10To see this, note that there is nothing in the model that forces the
ratio (a2/a1) to equal (b2/b1) or that ties those ratios to any property
of the function v( · ). Moreover, as the analysis above only deals with
situations such as those in our implementation of the DCM in which
the agent receives one unit of one dated good, it puts no restrictions
on how the agent views combinations of dated goods, multiple units
of a given good, or losses of either goods or money. The main restric-
tion that it does impose is additive separability of decision utility
between goods andmoney, but, as the goods andmoney are received
in different periods, that restriction would be implied by any model
in which the agent maximises an objective function that is additively
separable between time periods.
11Three related experiments used methods similar to the experi-
ment reported here and produced results that replicate the findings
reported in this paper. A further experiment used an alternative
methodology, and its results support the interpretation presented in
this paper. Details are available from the authors.
12More than 96% of respondents made a single switch in the choice
list. Of those who did not, three switched more than once (for these,
we coded cost of delay as the midpoint between the first and last
switch) and six (2%) did not switch even for $50. We excluded these
six individuals from our analysis of cost of delay because when
asked for to provide open-ended values ofWTA (without incentives),
their responses either contradicted earlier responses or seemed too
extreme to be credible. Two further respondents gave a different
answer in the first row of the response table than they gave in the pre-
liminary pairwise choice, which we interpreted as indicating indif-
ference (cost of delay 0).
13We confirmed our conclusions by replicating the analysis on the
set of all respondents (and dealing with those who did not switch in
different ways).
14Attribute-based approaches have previously been successfully
applied to discounting decisions involving money (e.g., Dai and
Busemeyer 2014, Ericson et al. 2015, Leland 2002, Rubinstein 2003,
Read et al. 2013, Scholten and Read 2010).
15Amore radical viewwould be that delay is entirely unimportant to
participants unless it is highlighted to them.One rationale, suggested
to us by a reviewer, is that people are used tomaking choices between
goods (for example, choosing between chocolates and pens) but less
used to choosing when they would be received.
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16Many similar models make related predictions in a wide range of
(usually atemporal) contexts. These include Tversky’s (1969) model
of intransitivity, regret theory (Bell 1982, Loomes and Sugden 1982,
1987), the cancellation and focusmodel (Houston and Sherman 1995,
Houston et al. 1989), the salience theory (Bordalo et al. 2012, 2013),
and the theory of focusing (including applications to intertemporal
choice; Kőszegi and Szeidl 2013).
17 It is also possible to reverse the inequalities if, contrary to order TP
and to order GP, the agent regards A as a better good than B when
both are delivered in period 1 but B as better than A when both are
delivered in period 2. Although this is logically possible, we do not
think it likely for the goods and time periods of our experiment.
18 In a more complete model, the elements in the vector will consist
of attributes that characterize various features of the options and not
just their presence or absence, and options might be partially over-
lapping on those attributes. Adding such elements would not alter
the logic of the argument we make but require more cumbersome
notation, so we set them aside.
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